We discuss the qualitative properties of efficient insurance contracts in the presence of background risk. In order to get results for all strictly risk averse expected utility maximizers, we use the concept of "stochastic increasingness." We show that different assumptions on the stochastic dependence between the insurable and uninsurable risk lead to different optimal contracts. We compare our results to the classical results in the absence of background risk or to the case of independent risks. The theory is further generalized to nonexpected utility maximizers.
Introduction
Since the early work of Arrow (1963) , Borch (1962) , many authors have considered the problem of the optimal sharing of risk between an insurer and an insured. In particular Arrow (1963 Arrow ( , 1970 Arrow ( , 1974 showed that if the premium set by a risk neutral insurer depends only on the actuarial value of the policy offered and is fair, then the optimal policy for a risk averse von-Neumann Morgenstern insured is full insurance. If the premium includes a factor loading, then the optimal policy contains full insurance above a deductible. This result played an important role in the literature since it shows that the insured's decision can be brought down to a one-dimensional problem, the choice of the optimal deductible (or equivalently of the optimal premium). In particular, it allows for comparative static results. Raviv (1979) reconsidered the problem under a more general set of assumptions: The insurer can be risk averse and the premium is a convex function of the supplied insurance. He showed that if the marginal cost is greater than one, then the efficient policy of a risk averse von-Neumann Morgenstern insured entails coinsurance above a deductible. Furthermore, if the insurer is risk averse and if the cost of insurance equals the supplied insurance, then the efficient policy is coinsurance. It may also be checked that, if the cost is too high, then the insured takes no insurance.
These results have at least two important implications: First, the insurer and the insured wealths are comonotone, both of them being nonincreasing function of the risk (in other words, there is risk sharing). Second, if there are no costs, then there are no deductibles, and, if there are costs, then there are deductibles. Hence costs explain deductibles.
A drawback of this analysis is that it assumes that markets are complete. As already mentioned by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a,b) , Schlesinger and Doherty (1985) and Gollier (1996) , first insurers prefer to cover different sources of risks by different contracts and next, some risks as war, floods, earthquakes, market risks, human capital are not insurable. Hence, it seems necessary to reconsider insurance problems under the assumption of background risk. Furthermore, the problem of insurance in the presence of background risk arises in the pricing of climatic options (the risk to be insured is a climatic risk and the background risk is the financial risk, see for example El Karoui (2002, 2003) ). It also arises when an insured faces a sequence of risks over time and chooses at each date an insurance contract that depends on the forthcoming risk and on her history.
It is well-known that the presence of background risk in wealth has an effect on the demand for other risks. Several authors have considered different risk postures of decision makers in the presence of background risk. Among them Ross (1981) , Kihlstrom et al. (1981) , Nachman (1982) , Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , Kimball (1993) , Gollier and Pratt (1996) , Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) , Finkelshtain et al. (1999) . An extended treatment of background risk and relevant references can be found in Gollier (2001) .
Insurance with background risk has been considered in various settings, since the early work of Doherty and Schlesinger (1983b) . Doherty and Schlesinger (1983b) first addressed the problem of insurance demand with background risk in a two states economy. The problem has been reconsidered by a number of authors (see the survey paper by Schlesinger (2000) who discusses the case of proportional coinsurance and independent and dependent background risk). This trend of literature, for the most part, has focused on comparing demand when there is background risk to demand when there is no background risk. Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) have considered background risk of loss such that a higher level of insurable risk implies a less risky distribution of the background risk loss in the sense of third degree stochastic dominance. Gollier (1996) first examined the problem of efficient contracts when there is background risk under the assumptions that the insurer is risk neutral, and that the premium is a function of the expected indemnity, with marginal increase greater then one. Assuming two sources of dependent risks such that the uninsurable risk has zero conditional expectation given any value of the insurable risk, he shows that if a higher level of insurable risk implies a more risky distribution of the background risk, then the deductible rule does not apply anymore. He shows that if the insured is prudent, then the optimal insurance contract entails a disappearing deductible. Efficient contracts when there is background risk were also considered by Mahul (2000) and Vercammen (2001) in slightly different models. In their models the risks are independent, but the loss in revenue is not additive. This paper will show that the shape of the optimal insurance contract will crucially depend on the type of dependence among the insurable and noninsurable risks.
The optimal contract results, that will be stated in the following, concern a large class of decision makers, and no parametric assumptions of the distribution of risks will be made. We will consider all strictly risk averse expected utility maximizers, namely, all agents whose von Neumann Morgenstern utility function is strictly concave. In order to get significant results for such a huge class of utility functions we need strong conditions of positive dependence among the risks.
It is definitely not enough to use some measure of dependence like the correlation coefficient. This would be possible only under very restrictive hypotheses on the choice criterion and on the parametric family of distributions for the risks. See for instance Luciano and Kast (2001) who used value at risk and normally distributed risks, or El Karoui (2002, 2003) , who dealt with climatic options in a normal framework.
The necessity to go beyond correlation in finance and insurance models has been emphasized among others by Embrechts et al. (1999 Embrechts et al. ( , 2002 .
The concept of dependence that will be used to prove our results is "stochastic increasingness" (or "stochastic decreasingness"). This concept was introduced under the name positive regression dependence by Lehmann (1966) and has been widely used in the applied probability literature (see e. g. Barlow and Proschan (1975) ).
A random variable X 2 is stochastically increasing in another random variable X 1 if conditioning on higher values of X 1 the conditional distribution of X 2 becomes larger in the sense of first degree stochastic dominance.
A simple extreme case of stochastic increasingness is given by X 1 and X 2 comonotone. Another simple case where stochastic increasingness arises is when a common environmental variable Θ is present. For instance assume that, given Θ, the random variables X 1 and X 2 are conditionally i. i. d. normally distributed with expectation Θ. If the prior distribution for Θ is itself normal, then X 2 is stochastically increasing in X 1 .
Stochastic increasingness is an asymmetric concept, namely, the fact that X 2 is stochas-tically increasing in X 1 does not imply that X 1 is stochastically increasing in X 2 . Nevertheless stochastic increasingness is implied by affiliation and implies association (see Karlin and Rinott (1980) and Esary et al. (1967) ). Both affiliation and association are symmetric concepts of positive dependence, whose definition will be given in the following section. Affiliation is a strong concept of positive dependence which has been extensively used in economics, especially in auction theory (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) ). Call X 1 the insurable risk and X 2 the uninsurable one. We will prove that if the total loss X 1 + X 2 is stochastically increasing in X 1 , then the indemnity of the efficient contract is nondecreasing. If X 2 is stochastically decreasing in X 1 , then the risk minus the indemnity of the efficient contract is nondecreasing. In the model we consider, the revenue of the insured is a function of the sum of the losses but more general revenue function may be considered.
We use a concept of positive dependence among the risks, to get results for for all strictly risk averse expected utility maximizers. With no surprise, many of our results hold true for a larger class of utility functions, those which are second order stochastic dominance preserving.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and analyzes the case of independent risks. In Sections 3, 4, and 5 the optimal contracts are determined under different stochastic dependence hypotheses of the risks. Section 6 considers some examples of parametric families of utility functions. Section 7 looks at robustness results for the optimal contract in the independent case. Section 8 deals with a nonexpected utility model. Section 9 considers various side issues. All the proofs appear in Section 10.
The model
Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space on which all the random variables will be defined. An agent with non-random endowment w faces two random losses X 1 and X 2 . The insurance market provides insurance only for X 1 which has support [0,x] . The law of X 1 will be assumed continuous. An insurance contract is characterized by a premium P and an indemnity schedule I : [0,x] → R which satisfies 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0,x]. When the insured buys the contract, she is endowed with the random wealth W = w − P − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ). The insured is assumed to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over random wealth represented by E[U (W )] where U : R → R is increasing, strictly concave, and C 1 . By selling the contract, the insurer gets P and promises to pay I(X 1 ) if a loss X 1 occurs. Her profit is assumed here to be of the form E[V (P −c(I(X 1 ))] where V : R → R is increasing, strictly concave, C 1 , and such that V (0) = 0, and c : R + → R + is a convex, increasing, and C 1 cost function satisfying c(0) = 0 and c (0) ≥ 1. Call Id the identity function Id(x) = x. A contract (P, I) is Pareto-efficient if it is a solution of the following program
We shall extensively use the fact that if (I * , P * ) is an efficient contract, then there exists a multiplier λ ∈ R + such that (I * , P * ) is the solution of
we have that at the optimal premium P * , for every x, I * (x) is the solution of a state by state maximization problem
We shall make use of some dependence concepts that we recall in the following definition (see for instance Lehmann (1966) or Joe (1997) ).
Definition 2.1. (i) The random variable X 2 is stochastically increasing in X 1 , denoted X 2 ↑ st X 1 (resp strictly stochastically increasing in
is nondecreasing (resp increasing) for every f nondecreasing (resp increasing).
(ii) X 2 is stochastically decreasing in X 1 , denoted X 2 ↓ st X 1 (resp strictly stochastically decreasing in
is nonincreasing (resp decreasing) for every f nondecreasing (resp increasing). Sklar (1959) showed that any joint distribution function can be decomposed into its marginals and a dependence structure, called copula. If X 2 ↑ st X 1 , Y 1 = f 1 (X 1 ), and Y 2 = f 2 (X 2 ), with f 1 , f 2 increasing, then Y 2 ↑ st Y 1 . This implies that stochastic increasingness depends on the joint distribution of (X 1 , X 2 ) only through its copula.
Two random variables X 1 and X 2 are called affiliated if the logarithm of their joint density is supermodular (see Definition 10.2 in Section 10). They are called associated if for any nondecreasing functions f, g : R 2 → R we have Cov[f (X 1 , X 2 ), g(X 1 , X 2 )] ≥ 0. As we mentioned in the Introduction, stochastic increasingness is a positive dependence concept that is stronger than affiliation and weaker than association.
We shall use the following terminology. Since 0 ≤ I ≤ Id, it is in general the case that a disappearing deductible contains full insurance on an interval [b,x] .
Our benchmark case will be the case of independent risks in which the optimal contract has the same properties as in the no-background-risk case, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2.3. Assume that X 1 and X 2 are independent.
(a) The program (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing.
There is insurance iff and (2. 3) holds, then the unique solution of (P) is a deductible.
(c) If furthermore m = 0, then the unique solution of (P) is full insurance.
(d) If V is strictly concave, and c(x) = x, then the unique solution of (P) is a coinsurance contract.
When there is no background risk, or the background risk is independent, then efficient contracts are such that (i) Agents' wealths are comonotone. Therefore anything that violates comonotonicity is ruled out: for example no insurance followed by coinsurance then full insurance violates the comonotonicity of I and Id-I. Thus we either have
• coinsurance
• full insurance
• no insurance followed by coinsurance
• full insurance followed by coinsurance.
(ii) When there are no costs, we either have full insurance if the insurer is risk neutral, or coinsurance if she is risk averse.
(iii) When there are costs, there is a deductible (with full insurance above the deductible if the insurer is risk neutral, or coinsurance if she is risk averse).
3 The case X 2 ↑ st X 1
In this section we will assume that X 2 ↑ st X 1 . This assumption is justified for instance in one of the following circumstances. An individual may insure her house, but not her car, against fire. If the car is parked in the driveway of the house and for some reason it gets on fire, there is a positive probability that the fire spreads to the house and damages it, or vice versa. Therefore, if X 1 is the insured risk related to the fire damage of the house, and X 2 is the uninsured risk related to the fire damage of the car, we see that the assumption X 2 ↑ st X 1 is quite reasonable.
We could consider a household with two individuals: one of them has health insurance, whereas the other doesn't. Since health insurances policies cover, among other things, risks related to infectious diseases, it is reasonable to assume that two people living in the same environment, are prone to get sick at the same time, and therefore there is positive dependence between the risks related to the health of the two individuals.
Again we could consider a household with two people working in the same field: one of them is insured against job loss, the other is not. Since firing of workers often depends on the general situation of the economy or of an industry, more than on their performances, it is quite likely that the two spouses could be dismissed at approximately the same time, so that the risks related to the dismissal of one is positively dependent on the risk related to the dismissal of the other.
In general risks that are somehow dependent on common environmental circumstances tend to exhibit positive dependence of the form X 2 ↑ st X 1 . For instance, let Θ be an environmental variable that affects both X 1 and X 2 , in such a way that E[X 2 | Θ] = Θ, and E[Θ | X 1 ] = f (X 1 ), with f increasing. Then X 2 is stochastically increasing in X 1 . The normal model described in the Introduction is a particular case of this.
We first state a general existence and monotonicity result obtained by supermodularity methods.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that X 2 ↑ st X 1 . Then, (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * is nondecreasing.
Then we specify conditions for the existence of insurance.
Proposition 3.2. Assume X 2 ↑ st X 1 . Then there is no insurance iff
The following proposition considers the special case of a risk neutral insurer.
There is no insurance iff
(c) When the optimal contract is interior,
The optimal contract is a disappearing deductible.
When there is positively dependent background risk, agents' wealths are not comonotone. Hence there may be more than two insurance regimes. No insurance followed by coinsurance then by full insurance and then coinsurance is feasible when the insurer is risk averse and bears costs. In the case of a risk neutral insurer, then there are at most three regimes: no insurance followed by coinsurance and then by full insurance.
Costs do not explain deductibles anymore. In particular, if the insurer is risk neutral and there are no costs, then there is a disappearing deductible.
In this section, we assume that the two risks are negatively dependent but that their sum is positively dependent on X 1 . This assumption is reasonable for instance in the following circumstances.
Most of the insurance contracts do not cover losses due to acts of terrorism or riots. Consider then a contract that covers the loss of a car, except if the loss is due to an act of terrorism. The risk of losing the car is decomposed into an insured component X 1 and an uninsured component X 2 . Since it's impossible to lose a car for two different reasons at the same time, the two components are negatively dependent in a very strong sense: Whenever one of them is positive, the other one is zero, hence they are anticomonotone, which implies (X 2 ↓ st X 1 ). On the other hand, since the probability of losing a car due to an act of terror is in general extremely small compared to the probability of losing it due to other reasons, the total risk X 1 + X 2 will be more heavily dependent on X 1 than on X 2 , and therefore the assumption X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 makes sense.
A person faces the risk of losing her spouse, who has life insurance. Life insurance policies usually do not cover suicide. Therefore the risk due to the loss of the spouse is decomposed into the insured component X 1 and the uninsured component X 2 relative to death due to suicide. Since the spouse cannot die due to suicide and to another reason at the same time, we have that X 2 ↓ st X 1 , but since suicide is statistically a very unlikely cause of death, we have
In general this assumption is reasonable in the following situation: Different causes may give rise to some risk, but the insurance coverage is provided only for some of the causes; the different causes are mutually exclusive; the probability of the claim happening for the uninsured causes is small compared to the probability of its happening for the insured causes.
We notice that, although stochastic increasingness of X 2 with respect to X 1 depends only on the copula of (X 1 , X 2 ), the hypothesis X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 depends on tjhe copula of (X 1 , X 1 + X 2 ), not on the copula of (X 1 , X 2 ).
Theorem 4.1. Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 and X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Then, (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing. Hence I * is 1-Lipschitz.
We shall show that in this case, an optimal contract has standard features: when there are costs, it is a generalized deductible. The "linear" properties of optimal contracts in the independent case are lost here. In particular, we show that in the case of linear costs the deductible becomes a generalized deductible. Similarly, when there are no costs, linear sharing rules become nonlinear (see Subsection 6.2, case 3).
Proposition 4.2. Assume X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 and X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Consider (P). Then (a) There is no insurance iff
, then the optimal contract is a generalized deductible.
The following proposition deals with a risk neutral insurer.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 and X 2 ↓ sst X 1 . If V (x) = ax and c(x) = (1 + m)x, then the optimal contract is not a deductible.
Then we consider the case of no costs.
There is insurance.
(b) If either V is strictly concave or if X 2 ↓ sst X 1 then the optimal contract verifies 0 < I * (x) < x, and is therefore a coinsurance contract.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, here we model the case where the background risk is small with respect to the insurable risk. It is not surprising that efficient contracts have properties which are similar to those of the benchmark model. Agents' wealths are comonotone. Costs explain deductibles (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.3). Only the linear properties of contracts are not robust to such perturbations.
The assumption of this section X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 is reasonable for instance in the following circumstances.
Consider a person whose spouse buys an insurance that covers loss of life due to a plane crash, but does not have any other form of life insurance. This case resembles the one examined in the previous section, in that the insured and uninsured risk are negatively dependent, since they are due to mutually exclusive causes. Therefore if X 2 is the uninsured risk and X 1 is the insured risk related to the plane-crash death of the spouse, then we have X 2 ↓ st X 1 . But now the insured risk is related to an event of very small probability compared to the probability of the event that corresponds to the uninsured risk. Therefore X 1 is somehow negligible with respect to X 2 , and it can happen that X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 .
We first give a general result.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Then (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ). Furthermore Id −I * is nondecreasing, and I * is nonincreasing whenever interior. Hence, there exist x 0 , x 1 with 0 ≤ x 0 ≤ x 1 ≤x such that
Theorem 5.1 does not rule out no insurance or full insurance. This is the reason why, in each specific case, we rule out these boundary solutions.
Proposition 5.2. Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Consider (P).
(a) There is no insurance iff
Again we consider the case of a risk neutral insurer with no costs.
Proposition 5.3. Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↓ sst X 1 , that V (x) = ax, and c(x) = x. Then neither I = 0, nor full insurance are optimal.
The case described in this section is also the case where the wealth w of the insured is random, positively dependent on the insurable risk X 1 and such that w − X 1 is positively dependent on X 1 .
Examples
In this section we will consider some particular cases of utility functions.
Since we will restrict our attention to an exponential family of utility functions, the stochastic dependence assumptions needed to obtain the properties of the optimal contracts will be much weaker than the ones used in the previous sections. In particular they will depend explicitly on the conditional expectation of the marginal utility of −X 1 − X 2 given X 1 and on the marginal utility of −X 2 given X 1 .
A CARA agent who exchanges with a risk neutral insurer
Assume that
In the absence of background risk, the optimal contract is a deductible. When
the optimal deductible verifies 0 < d <x and is the unique solution of the equation
Let us assume that there is background risk and let g(
Hence, there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ ∈ R + such that
At the optimal premium P * , for every X 1 , we have that I * (X 1 ) solves the one-dimensional problem
When I * is interior, we get
To illustrate the previous sections, we shall consider three cases:
Case 1. The function g is nondecreasing which implies that x → g(x)e γx is increasing. We have this case for instance when X 2 ↑ st X 1 .
• If m = 0, then there is insurance. Furthermore, if g is not constant, then full insurance is not optimal. There is a disappearing deductible:
The values of d andx may be determined by two equations (a similar computation is done below).
• If m > 0 and
then there is no insurance.
then there is insurance and full insurance is not optimal. As in the case m = 0, there is a disappearing deductible. If I * = 0 on [0, d] and I * is interior on [d,x] , then the optimal deductible d is determined by the equation
Compare this with equation (6.2).
Since exp{γx}
then, in the absence of background risk, the agent would not take insurance.
In the presence of background risk, she does.
Case 2. The function x → g(x) exp{γx} is nondecreasing and g is nonincreasing (this happens for instance when X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 and X 2 ↓ st X 1 ). Then both I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing.
• If m = 0, there is insurance if x → g(x) exp{γx} is not constant. If g is not constant, then full insurance is not optimal and the optimal contract is a coinsurance contract. The optimal contract is given by
then there is no insurance
then there is insurance and the optimal contract is a generalized deductible. The optimal deductible d is determined by (6.6) and when interior, the optimal contract is given by
we have that, if
then, in the presence of background risk, the agent would not take insurance.
In the absence of background risk, she does.
Case 3. The function x → g(x) exp{γx} is nonincreasing, which implies that g is decreasing (this happens for instance when X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 ). Then Id −I * is nondecreasing and I * is nonincreasing when interior.
• When m = 0, there is insurance if x → g(x) exp{γx} is not constant. Full insurance is not optimal. There exists x 0 , x 1 with 0 ≤ x 0 ≤ x 1 ≤x such that
• If
then there is insurance and there exists x 0 , x 1 with 0 ≤ x 0 ≤ x 1 ≤x such that
. The values of x 0 and x 1 are determined by the following two equations
6.2 The case of two CARA agents and no cost
In the absence of background risk, the efficient contract (P * , I * ) is the solution of
hence there is a linear risk sharing rule between the insured and the insurer. Let us assume that there is background risk. Let now g(
for some λ ≥ 0. At the optimal premium, I * (x) solves the one-dimensional problem
When I * is interior, we have
We shall consider three cases:
Case 1. The function g is nondecreasing. No insurance is not optimal and if x → g(x) exp{−γ A x} is not constant, then full insurance is not optimal. The optimal contract is a disappearing deductible. When there is no background risk, the optimal contract is
Hence, the presence of background risk lowers the contract up to some value of the risk and then increases it.
Case 2. The function x → g(x) exp{γ B x} is nondecreasing and g is nonincreasing. Both I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing. There is insurance and if x → g(x) exp{γ B x} is not constant, then full insurance is not optimal and 0 < I * (x) < x for all x. Hence
The comonotonicity properties of agents' wealth still hold but the linear risk sharing rule is not robust. The presence of background risk lowers the contract.
Case 3. The function x → g(x) exp{γx} is nonincreasing, which implies that g is decreasing. Then Id −I * is nondecreasing and I * is nonincreasing when interior, and no insurance are optimal. If x → g(x) exp{γ B x} is not constant, then full insurance is not optimal. There exists x 0 , x 1 with 0 ≤ x 0 ≤ x 1 ≤x such that
* is nonincreasing on [x 0 , x 1 ] and I * = 0 on [x 1 ,x]. The values of x 0 and x 1 are determined by the following two equations
In this section we will consider some particular cases of utility functions. Since we will restrict our attention to an exponential family of utility functions, the stochastic dependence assumptions needed to obtain the properties of the optimal contracts will be much weaker than the ones used in the previous sections. In particular they will depend explicitly on the conditional expectation of the marginal utility of −X 1 − X 2 given X 1 .
Robustness of linear properties
When a risk-averse agent exchanges risk X 1 with a risk-neutral insurer who bears no cost, then the optimal contract is full insurance. The result holds true when there is an uninsurable background risk X 2 independent of X 1 . Conversely, we have the following result.
Proposition 7.1. Let U strictly concave, increasing, and C 1 , be a fixed von NeumannMorgenstern utility function. Assume that the solution to the program
is full insurance for any marginal distribution of X 1 and X 2 . Then X 1 and X 2 are independent.
In the case of two CARA agents with independent background risk the optimal risk sharing is linear. The following proposition provides a converse to this result.
Proposition 7.2. Consider the following program
with g(X) = E[exp{γ B X 2 } | X 1 ], and assume that for any marginal distributions of X 1 and X 2 , its optimal solution is the contract (P * , I * ) such that
Then X 1 and X 2 are independent.
The case of nonexpected utilities
The model is as in the previous section except that we do not assume agents to be expected utility maximizers. In what follows, L ∞ denotes L ∞ ((Ω, A, P ).
Let u : L ∞ → R and v : L ∞ → R be the insured and insurer's utility and c : R + → R + be a cost function fulfilling the assumptions of Section 2. A contract (P, I) is efficient if it is a solution of
We make the following assumptions on u and v:
(B) For h ∈ {u, v}, h is strictly monotone, that is, for all Y ≥ 0 a.e. Y = 0 and all X ∈ L ∞ , h(X + Y ) > h(X).
Furthermore lim P →∞ u(−P ) = −∞.
Assumption (C) is called second-order-stochastic-dominance-preserving utility. Examples of second order stochastic dominance preserving utilities may be found in Chew and Mao (1995) .
Remark 8.2. It follows from (C) that if X and Y have same distribution, then u(X) = u(Y ) and v(X) = v(Y ).
Theorem 8.3. Let u and v satisfy (A), (B), (C). Then (a) If X 2 ↑ st X 1 , then, (Q) has an optimal solution. Furthermore, any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * is nondecreasing.
(b) If X 2 ↓ st X 1 and X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 , then, (Q) has an optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing. Moreover if X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , then any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing.
(c) Assume that X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Then (Q) has an optimal solution. Any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that Id −I * is nondecreasing and I * is nonincreasing whenever interior.
Miscellanea 9.1 Other dependence concepts
Other types of dependence concepts between X 1 and X 2 may be considered. Let us first give a definition.
Definition 9.1. An increase in X 1 induces X 2 to be less risky if for every u concave increasing and for all x < y we have
If the inequality is strict for every u strictly concave increasing, then the increase in X 1 induces X 2 to be strictly less risky. The increase in X 1 induces X 2 to be more risky if the above inequality sign is reversed.
Assuming that the insured is prudent (U > 0), we can prove the same results as those of Sections 3, 4, and 5. Let us give an example of such result. Proposition 9.2. Assume that the insured is prudent. Assume that an increase in X 1 induces X 2 to be less risky. Then, (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * is nondecreasing. If the insurer is risk neutral and costs are affine, then there is no insurance iff
If either m > 0, or if X 1 induces X 2 to be strictly less risky, then the optimal contract is a disappearing deductible.
Gollier considers background risks X 2 with the property that, for some a, E[X 2 | X 1 = x] = a for every x. He then defines an increase in X 1 to induce X 2 to be less risky if
for every u concave. The result stated above remains true: If the insured is prudent and if the increase in X 1 induces X 2 to be less risky, then I * is nondecreasing. If the insurer is risk neutral and costs are affine, if there is insurance and either m > 0, or X 1 induces X 2 to be strictly less risky, then the optimal contract is a disappearing deductible.
An insurer with random wealth
We have assumed that the insurer's wealth was not random. Let us now assume that the insurer's wealth, denoted X 3 , is random. Let X 3 + P − c(I) be the insurer's wealth when the contract (I, P ) is offered. Assume that the insurer is risk-averse. Let us finally assume that X 3 and X 1 are dependent (this assumption is natural in the context of reinsurrance) . We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 9.3. Assume that X 1 +X 2 ↑ st X 1 and X 3 ↑ st X 1 Then, (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * is nondecreasing. If X 1 + X 2 ↓ st X 1 and X 3 − X 1 ↓ st X 1 , then, (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that Id −I * is nondecreasing.
Comparative statics
Several papers have considered comparative statics issues in the presence of background risk (references can be found in Schlesinger (2000)). Most of them deal with parametric models where there is either coinsurance or a deductible. They focus on comparing the optimal contract in the presence of background risk with the optimal contract without background risk. The situation becomes much more difficult when efficient contracts are considered. If the insurer is risk neutral and faces no costs, then, under the assumptions of Sections 3 and 4, we have that without background risk there is full insurance, and with background risk there is either a disappearing deductible or a generalized deductible. These results remain true for small values of the loading factor.
Nothing can be said in general when both the insurer and the insured are risk averse. On the other hand, when they are both CARA, and there is no cost, without background risk we have a linear sharing rule, and with background risk we have either a disappearing deductible or a generalized deductible.
Nonseparable background risk
In this paper, we have considered the case of additively separable background risk (X 1 + X 2 ). We could more generally have considered an aggregate loss of the form f (X 1 , X 2 ) as Vercammen (2001) or Mahul (2000) .
we obtain that ifψ P is supermodular, the optimal contract is nondecreasing. Similarly if
is supermodular, the optimal contract is such that Id −I is nondecreasing. Vercammen (2001) or Mahul (2000) consider only the independent case. In that caseψ P is supermodular if f (·, y) is nondecreasing, and g(·, y) is supermodular if Id −f (·, y) is nondecreasing.
In the general caseψ P is supermodular if f (X 1 , X 2 ) ↑ st X 1 , whereas g P is supermodular if
Proofs
For further use, we state a few definitions and lemmata.
Lemma 10.1. (a) If X 2 is stochastically increasing in X 1 , and X 1 is non-degenerate, then X 1 + X 2 is strictly stochastically increasing in X 1 .
(b) If X 1 + X 2 is stochastically decreasing in X 1 , and X 1 and X 2 are non-degenerate, then X 2 is strictly stochastically decreasing in X 1 .
Proof. (a) Denote by [X | A] a random variable that has the distribution of X given A, and let = st denote equality in law. If X 2 ↑ st X 1 , then, for x < y, we have
which in turn is equivalent to
by transitivity, we have the result.
for all x 1 < x 2 , y 1 < y 2 . If the inequality is strict, the function φ is called strictly supermodular.
Example 10.3. We provide some examples of supermodular functions. If f : R → R and g : R → R are either both increasing or both decreasing, and φ(x 1 , x 2 ) = f (x 1 )g(x 2 ), then φ is supermodular.
Consider a convex function ψ : R → R, and define φ(x 1 , x 2 ) = ψ(x 1 + x 2 ). Then φ is supermodular.
Analogously, if ξ : R → R is concave, and φ(x 1 , x 2 ) = ξ(x 1 − x 2 ), then φ is supermodular. This case will be used extensively in our applications.
Definition 10.4. A function I is a rearrangement of I with respect to X if I(X) and I(X) have the same distribution.
Lemma 10.5. Let X be a random variable with support [0,x] and a continuous distribution F X . Let I be a nondecreasing rearrangement of I with respect to X. Then for any supermodular function φ we have
If φ is strictly supermodular, then equality holds only if I = I a. e..
(b) For every Borel subset
where I A is a nondecreasing rearrangement of I on A.
Proof. Part (a) follows from more general inequalities for expectations of distributions with fixed marginals. See e. g. Cambanis et al. (1976 ) Tchen (1980 . Part (b) was proved by means of different techniques by Carlier and Dana (2002) .
Lemma 10.6. Let X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 , and let I be a nondecreasing rearrangement of I with respect to X 1 . Then for all concave increasing function U : R → R and for all w ≥ 0 and P ≥ 0, we have
Moreover if X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , and U is strictly concave, then the inequality is strict unless I is nondecreasing.
Since U is decreasing and X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 , then ∂ψ P (·, y)/∂y is nondecreasing. From Lemma 10.5 we have
proving the desired result. Moreover if U is decreasing and X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , then, from Lemma 10.5, the inequality is strict unless I is nondecreasing.
Lemma 10.7. Assume that X 2 ↓ st X 1 . Let Z : [0,x] → R and Z be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to X 1 . Then for all concave increasing function U : R → R and for all w ≥ 0 and P ≥ 0, we
Moreover if U is strictly concave and X 2 ↓ sst X 1 , then the inequality is strict unless Z is nondecreasing.
Since U is nonincreasing and X 2 ↓ st X 1 , then ∂φ P (·, z)/∂z is nondecreasing. From Lemma 10.5 we have
Moreover if U is strictly concave and X 2 ↓ sst X 1 , from Lemma 10.5, then the inequality is strict unless Z is nondecreasing.
Section 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3. (a) Let U : R → R be defined by U (x) = E[U (x − X 2 )]. Then U inherits the properties of U . Since X 1 and X 2 are independent, (P) may be rewritten as a standard Pareto problem without background risk:
Hence (P) has a unique optimal solution (P * , I * ) such that I * and Id −I * are nondecreasing. From (2.1) and (2.2), the contract (I * = 0, P * = 0) is optimal iff there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
] as was to be proven.
The fact that I and Id −I are nondecreasing is well-known. For sake of completeness, let us show that the optimal policy is a generalized deductible. Since I and Id −I are comonotone, there are three possible cases: Full insurance followed by coinsurance, coinsurance, and generalized deductible. Let us rule out the first two cases.
Let us first show that a contract such that I(x) = x for x ∈ [0, x 0 ], with 0 < x 0 ≤x, and 0 < I(x) < x, for x ∈ [x 0 ,x], is not optimal. For if it were, differentiating with respect to P , we would have for some λ ≥ 0
Integrating over [0,x] , we get a contradiction.
If there is coinsurance, we similarly obtain that for some λ > 0
which also leads to a contradiction. Hence the only possible case is that of a generalized deductible.
(b) As is well-known, if V (x) = ax, c(x) = (1 + m)x, the solution of (P) is no insurance if the cost is too high and a deductible otherwise.
(c) If V (x) = ax, c(x) = x, and (2.3) holds, then the unique solution of (P) is full insurance.
(d) Let us first remark that since
, then there is insurance.
Let us next show that a contract such that I(x) = x for x ∈ [0, x 0 ], with 0 < x 0 ≤x, and 0 < I(x) < x, for x ∈ [x 0 ,x], is not optimal. For if it were, differentiating with respect to P , we would have for some λ ≥ 0
and
Integrating over [0,x] , we get
which is a contradiction since the function −V is increasing. If a regime of no insurance for low values of the risk is followed by a coinsurance regime, we similarly obtain that for some λ > 0 and
which leads to a contradiction since the function −U is increasing.
Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let I be any feasible contract and let I be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to X 1 . We have
Moreover 0 ≤ I ≤ Id. Furthermore, for any U strictly concave increasing, from Lemma 10.1 and Lemma 10.6 we have
To show the existence of an optimal solution, let (P n , I n ) be a maximizing sequence with I n nondecreasing. Since lim P →∞ U (−P ) = −∞, the sequence P n is bounded. By Helly's theorem, the sequence (P n , I n ) has a limit point (P * , I * ), with I n → I * pointwise and I * nondecreasing. Clearly 0 ≤ I * ≤ Id. By Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem
therefore I * is feasible. Furthermore, using again Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, we have
hence (P * , I * ) is optimal. Since U is strictly concave, I * (X 1 ) − P * is unique but since I * (0) = 0, then (P * , I * ) is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Differentiating with respect to P and I, we have that (I * = 0, P * = 0) is optimal iff there exists λ such that
is increasing and (10.2) implies
From (10.1) a necessary condition for (I * = 0, P * = 0) to be optimal is that
Conversely if (10.3) holds, let
Hence we have (10.2). From (10.3) we get
hence (10.1). Thus (I * = 0, P * = 0) is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. (a) This is just a corollary of Proposition 3.2.
(b) If full insurance were optimal, differentiating with respect to P and I, we would have that for some λ ≥ 0
Integrating with respect to X 1 we get a contradiction, if m > 0.
Assume now that m = 0. Combining (10.4) and (10.5) we get
is increasing.
(c) Assume that I is interior. Defining Z(x) = x − I(x), we then have that, for some
is increasing, we obtain that x → x − I(x) is nonincreasing.
(d) Let us first remark that if I(x 0 ) = x 0 for some x 0 , then I(x) = x for x ≥ x 0 . Indeed, we then have, for some λ > 0,
Let us now characterize the optimal contract. From Theorem 3.1, I * is nondecreasing. The optimal contract cannot be interior in a neighborhood of zero, since from (c), when interior, it must be nonincreasing. If I * (x) = x for x ∈ [0, x 0 ], then as we remarked above, the optimal contract would be full insurance contradicting (b). Hence we first have a regime of no insurance for low values of the risk. Then, either I * is interior, and Id −I * is nonincreasing, or, as we remarked, if I(x 0 ) = x 0 for some x 0 , then I(x) = x for x ≥ x 0 . Hence there is a disappearing deductible.
Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Z * = Id −I * and let Z * be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to X 1 . From Lemma 10.5, since the function h P * (x, z) :
Therefore Id − Z * is feasible. We have 0 ≤ Z * ≤ Id. Furthermore, for any U concave, since X 2 ↓ st X 1 , we have from Lemma 10.7
If Z * = Z * , the uniqueness of an optimal contract is contradicted. Hence Z * = Z * as was to be proven.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) We skip this part, which is similar to the previous proofs.
(b) Since (I * = 0, P * = 0) is not optimal, then P * > 0 and I * = 0 (if not the constraint
Let us show that the contract (P, I) such that I(x) = x for x ∈ [0, x 0 ] with 0 < x 0 ≤x and 0 < I(x) < x for x ∈ [x 0 ,x] is not optimal. For if it were, we would have
Integrating over [0,x] , we get a contradiction with (10.6).
Let us also remark that the contract (P, I) such that 0 < I(x) < x for x ∈ [0,x] is not optimal, since
also contradicts (10.6) since c (I(x)) > 1. Hence there exists x 0 > 0, such that I * (x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x 0 ], and 0 < I * (x) < x for x > x 0 .
Proof of Proposition 4.3. When interior, I fulfills the equation
is increasing, hence Id −I is increasing, which rules out the existence of a deductible.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (a) Since
, as in the previous cases, one can verify that (I * = 0, P * = 0) is not optimal.
(b) Let us show that the contract (P, I) such that I(x) = x for x ∈ [0, x 0 ] with 0 < x 0 ≤x, and 0 < I(x) < x for x ∈ [x 0 ,x] is not optimal if V is strictly concave or if X 2 ↓ sst X 1 .
For if it were, we would have
Similarly, we may not have I(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, x 0 ] with 0 < x 0 ≤x and 0 < I(x) < x for x ∈ [x 0 ,x] if either V is strictly concave or if X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 . Hence 0 < I * (x) < x.
Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We have 0 ≤ Z ≤ Id, and
From Lemma 10.1 and Lemma 10.7 we have
with a strict inequality if Z = Z. Therefore we may assume without loss of generality that a contract I is such that Id −I is nondecreasing. Existence and uniqueness of an optimal contract I * follow from the same type of arguments as in Theorem 3.1. Lastly to show that I * is non increasing whenever interior, let A be an interval such that 0 < I * (x) < x for every x ∈ A and let I = I * for every x ∈ A c and I be the non-increasing rearrangement of I * on A. We have
and from Lemma 10.6,
with a strict inequality unless I * is non-increasing on A.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. (a)
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.2, using the fact that the map
(b) If full insurance were optimal, we would have
Integrating with respect to X 1 , we get a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. The contract (I * = 0, P * = 0) is optimal iff there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
is decreasing and (10.8) and (10.9) are equivalent to
we have a contradiction. Let's now prove that full insurance is not optimal. If it were, differentiating with respect to P and I, we would have that for some λ ≥ 0
is decreasing and we have a contradiction.
Section 7
Proof of Proposition 7.1. If full insurance is the solution to the problem (P 0 ), differentiating with respect to P and I, we get that there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
Cov[Z, X 1 ] = 0 for all marginal distributions of Z and X 1 . Then by Lehmann (1966) we have
where C Z,X 1 is the copula of F Z,X 1 . This is possible only if C Z,X 1 (u, v) = uv, namely, if Z and X 1 are independent, which in turns implies that X 1 and X 2 are independent.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. If
then I is interior. From (6.7), we thus obtain
Hence g is a constant. An argument analogous to the one used in the proof of Proposition 7.1 proves that X 1 and X 2 are independent.
Section 8
Proof of Theorem 8.3. (a) Let us prove the first assertion. Assume that X 2 ↑ st X 1 . Let us show that we may assume without loss of generality that a contract is nondecreasing. Indeed let I be any feasible contract and let I be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to X 1 . First we have 0 ≤ I ≤ Id. Since v fulfills (C), and since I(X 1 ) and I(X 1 ) have same distribution, we have v(P − c(I(X 1 ))) = v(P − c( I(X 1 ))). For any U concave, we have from Lemma 10.1 and Lemma 10.7
Hence from (C) u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P ) ≥ u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P )
If further X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , the inequality is strict for any U strictly concave unless I is nondecreasing.
To show the existence of an optimal solution, let (P n , I n ) be a maximizing sequence with I n nondecreasing. Since lim P →∞ u(−P ) = −∞, the sequence P n is bounded. By Helly's theorem, the sequence (P n , I n ) has a limit point (P * , I * ), with I n → I * pointwise and I * nondecreasing. Clearly 0 ≤ I * ≤ Id. Since v fulfills (A), then v(P * − c(I * )) ≥ lim sup v(P n − c(I n )) ≥ v(0), therefore v(P * − c(I * )) ≥ v(0).
Since u fulfills (A), then u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * ) ≥ lim sup u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I n (X 1 ) − P n ), hence (P * , I * ) is optimal with I * is nondecreasing, which proves the existence of an optimal solution.
To prove that any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * is nondecreasing, let (P * , I * ) be an optimal solution. From Lemma 10.1, since X 2 ↑ st X 1 , then X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , hence from Lemma 10.6, if I * is not nondecreasing, then W −X 1 −X 2 + I * (X 1 )−P * 2 W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * , hence u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * ) > u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * ), a contradiction. Therefore, any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * is nondecreasing.
(b) Since X 1 + X 2 ↑ st X 1 , as in the previous case, we may assume, using Lemma 10.6, without loss of generality that a contract is nondecreasing. Existence of an optimal solution follows. If X 1 + X 2 ↑ sst X 1 , then, from Lemma 10.6, any optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * is nondecreasing. To show that Id −I * is nondecreasing, let Z * = Id −I * and Z * be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to X 1 and I * = Id − Z * . For any U , we have,from Lemma 10.6
hence, since u fulfills (A), u(w − X 2 − Z * (X 1 ) − P * ) ≥ u(w − X 2 − Z * (X 1 ) − P * ).
If Z * = Z * , since L(x, z) = V (P * − c(x − z)) is strictly supermodular, by Lemma 10.5, we have E[V (P * − c(X 1 − Z * (X 1 )))] > E[V (P * − c(X 1 − Z * (X 1 )))], for any V strictly concave. Hence, since v fulfills (C), we have v(P * − c(X 1 − Z * (X 1 ))) > v(P * − c(X 1 − Z * (X 1 ))).
Therefore, for some ε > 0, the contract (P * − ε, I * ) is feasible and dominates (P * , I * ) contradicting its optimality. Hence Z * = Z * as was to be proven.
(c) Similarly in the last case, from Lemma 10.6, we may assume without loss of generality that a contract I is such that Id−I is nondecreasing. Existence of an optimal contract follows from the same type of arguments as above. Nondecreasingness of Id −I * also. To show that I * is nonincreasing whenever interior, let A be an interval such that 0 < I * (x) < x for every x ∈ A and let I = I * for every x ∈ A c and I be the nonincreasing rearrangement of I * on A. We have v(P * − c(I)) = v(P * − c(I * )) since v fulfills (C). Furthermore for any concave U , E[U (W − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P * )] ≥ E[U (W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * )] with a strict inequality unless I * is nonincreasing on A. Hence u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P * ) ≥ u(W − X 1 − X 2 + I * (X 1 ) − P * ) with a strict inequality unless I * is nonincreasing on A.
Section 9
Proof of Proposition 9.2. Since this proof is very tedious, we will just explain the main lines of the argument. To show that the optimal solution (P * , I * ) is such that I * is nondecreasing, we use the same method of proof as in Theorem 3.1. We show that any contract (P, I) is dominated by (P, I) with I a nondecreasing rearrangement of I with respect to X 1 .
First we remark that, if X 1 induces X 2 to be less risky, then it induces X 1 + X 2 to be strictly less risky. We then show that if I is a nondecreasing rearrangement of I with respect to X 1 , then for all concave increasing function U : R → R and for all w ≥ 0 and P ≥ 0, we have E[U (w − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P )] ≥ E[U (w − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P )].
Indeed, as in Lemma 10.6 below, let ψ P (x, y) = E[U (w − X 2 − x + y − P ) | X 1 = x]. We have ∂ψ P ∂y (x, y) = E[U (w − X 2 − x + y − P ) | X 1 = x].
Since −U is concave increasing, x → E[U (w−X 2 −x+y −P ) | X 1 = x] is nondecreasing and ∂ψ P (·, y)/∂y is nondecreasing which implies that ψ P is supermodular. The other assertions follow either from the fact that x → E[U (w − X 2 − x + y − P ) | X 1 = x] is nondecreasing or from the fact that x → E[U (w − X 2 − E(X 1 )) | X 1 = x] is nondecreasing.
Proof of Proposition 9.3. We use the same method of proof as in Theorem 3.1. We show that any contract (P, I) is dominated by (P, I) with I a nondecreasing rearrangement of I with respect to X 1 . From Lemma 10.6, we have E[U (w − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P )] ≥ E[U (w − X 1 − X 2 + I(X 1 ) − P )].
Let h P (x, y) = E[V (X 3 − y + P ) | X 1 = x]. We have ∂h P ∂y (x, y) = E[−V (X 3 − y + P ) | X 1 = x].
